Since Trump, Vance and Hegseth have all made it clear that the USA is no longer bound by the NATO treaty, it’s not clear why the European members should pay attention to this unsolicited advice. They have in short order to rebuild their collective security minus the USA, and spend what they need to do it. There is no reason why they would need to spend anything like 5% of GDP for this.
The complete list of major military threats Europe needs to guard against is as follows:
1. Russian autocracy and imperialism.
There is no point 2. Jihadi terrorism, cyberwarfare and climate disruption are real securitty dangers, but cannot be dealt with by conventional armed forces. The USA may conceivably get itself into shooting wars with China over Taiwan or with Iran over Israel, but Europe has no reason to join in. Middle Eastern oil is fast becoming unimportant, in a buyers’ market of shrinking demand. There is no appetite for intervention in Africa’s civil wars, beyond the quixotic low-key French struggle for influence in the Sahel, in the poorest countries on Earth.
Russia, in case you hadn’t noticed, is tied up in a very costly war of its own choosing with Ukraine. It has lost a large part of the equipment it began with, and struggles unsuccessfully to replace, and an enormous number of soldiers. https://babel.ua/en/news/115436-general-staff-russia-lost-another-1-180-soldiers-and-11-tanks The threat it represents to other European countries such as Poland, Finland and is far *less* than in 2022. You could make a strong case that non-Ukraine defence spending could be cut, not raised. Why does the Royal Navy need aircraft carriers?
My suggestion is to forget about the total volume of defence spending and concentrate on the one real problem, arming Ukraine to defend itself. Initially, the urgent need is to replace lost US military aid. The 2024 US package was $61.3 bn, and Trump is obviously not going to renew it. BTW, MAGA suckers, most of this was spent in-country on US arms, creating manufacturing Real Jobs with Lockheed and General Dynamics. Europe will shift as much of this as possible to its own arms industry, to BAE, Thales, Nammo and Rheinmetall. American jobs will be lost.
What are the magnitudes here? US nominal GDP is about $27 trn, the EU’s $20 trn. Add the UK and Norway, solid allies of Ukraine, and you get $24 trn. $61.3 bn is 0.25% of $24 trn. Add non-military aid and an increase for luck, say $100 bn a year. This makes 0.42% of GDP. Non-Ukraine defence spending can be left flat. This all needs to be sharpened up, but at worst Europe is looking at an increase in defence spending of 0.5% of GDP.
The venerable Michael Ignatieff was on radio the other day https://www.abc.net.au/listen/programs/global-roaming/global-roaming-canada-america-trump-michael-ignatieff/104855450. He concluded (I think) that the "world" was re-organising into three poles, headed by Russia, China & USA. Saying (I think, again) that China will be left to control East Asia, Russia to control Europe and USA it's immediate region. Timothy Snyder is on the EU's case, urging the European democracies to shape up to the imminent pressures.
Seems to me that Australia's importance is to the Anglophone collective as a critical piece of real estate for defending its values, and as resource of minerals. But on the matter of those rare earths & critical minerals, we've probably left the run too late. Either the leases are already in the hands of private enterprise, or the business of breaking new ground will be much more difficult due to pre-existing claims over ownership.
A spokesperson for a manufacturing union (??) was on ABC radio today pleading for more home-grown processing of iron & aluminium. I can hear the IPA & Murdoch's foot-soldiers screaming already. (More unionists! Heaven forbid!) I fear not even an Albanese-led ALP has the courage to stand up for trades unions as a central harmonising & civilising part of a liberal democracy. Jason Stanley in 'How Fascism Works' has a pretty good explanation of why labor unions are always in the sights of autocratic forces.
This greatly overestimates Russia, which is little more than a Chinese client now, incapable of defeating Ukraine, let alone the EU as a whole. Europe is the third pole and the only big representative of democracy left
As for the Anglosphere (including Deep State relics like the Five Eyes), Trump's threat to invade Canada will put paid to that idea fairly soon
I point to Branko Milanovic's https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/how-the-mainstream-has-abandoned where he signs off with "This is not a world of globalization, but of parceled regionalisms and even nationalism." How Australia shakes out in the longer term is less up to our "allies" (US, UK or 5Eyes) and much more on how we can re-fashion a national project.
Also to note that EU has a way to go in order to present a consolidated front to oppose Putin's take-over of Moldova. EU doesn't have a common language nor a centrally organised military.
I went to the library yesterday to catch up on Nick Bryant's latest in The Age. Reminded me how newspapers are a dead loss (for nit-picky consumers like me.) This one was packed with ads and lifestyle garbage. Outlets like Substack are helpful in providing "free" access to a wide diversity of written thought, but I can't fathom how serious writers can make a living. Thanks for the opportunity to sound off. 🫡
It seems that all agreements are rock solid until they aren't, the reason for breach being for "self defence". Threats don't necessarily have to be in a military form; attacks on culture, morality or identity will suffice. Culture wars precede military conflict, they just won't give up will they?
So when considering the alternatives, we don't seem to have much to choose from.
I view AUKUS as extortion and that seems to be how it is, we have to buy our peace in instalments. My next car will be a Chinese EV.
I agree with John’s optimistic take on Ukraine. Admittedly I have been wrong before on short-term battlefield prospects. I underestimated the fatalistic resilience of Russian soldiers, and ability to keep going with inferior equipment and commanders. But the basic argument for Ukrainian victory is unchanged.
Putin’s Bonapartist system is far more fragile than Soviet Communism, let alone democracy. It relies on the acquiescence rather than the commitment of ordinary Russians, sustained by nonstop fantasy propaganda on TV and exemplary repression rather than blanket police-state microsurveillance. The system is vulnerable to shocks, as the Prigozhin drama showed. .Accordingly Putin has not felt able to put Russia on a true war footing, as Ukraine has done. In particular there is no full mobilisation and Russian men have to be enticed to volunteer by large signup bonuses. Nor has he felt able to confiscate their phones, so the Russian web is full of horrible videos showing the appalling conditions and continuous heavy losses of men and equipment at the front. Ukrainian control of the skies is so great that drones are sent out in swarms to hunt down defenceless single soldiers and kill them with small grenades. Brainwashed into fear of “Nazi” cruelty, few take the option of surrendering to a drone.
Access to social media has not yet enabled organised mutiny, but first-hand news filters back to families and makes new recruitment steadily more difficult and expensive. Russia makes small gains in territory, but at massive cost: typically well over 1,000 casualties a day, and a steady drain on air defence, armoured and soft-skinned vehicles, and artillery.
Most of the public in Ukraine’s allies get their news from mass media biased towards heart-rending images of regular senseless attacks on Ukrainian civilians – the power grid and rail system stay operational in spite of ineffective attacks. Ukraine’s manpower problems and draft evasion are well-aired. Only aficionados like me seek out information on successful Ukrainian defensive operations, and deep drone and missile strikes on oil refineries, tank farms, airfields, ammunition dumps, and command posts, which Russia is powerless to stop. One refinery set on fire was in Omsk, 2,000 km east of Moscow: this must have been sabotage rather than a drone. Ukraine can keep these up indefinitely, until the logistics at the front break down completely.
Hegseth said today that the USA was deprioritising Europe and opined that return to Ukraine’s 2014 borders was “unrealistic”. He and Trump can’t have it both ways. If the USA is walking away from NATO, it doesn’t have a veto on its European members. I’ve pointed out before, that the diplomatic rule of consensus is a lot weaker than it looks at first sight, since the (n-1) other countries can always reassemble in the next room and adopt the policy you are trying to veto. NATO would be more complicated than this to unwind, but the same principle holds. “Very well, together” may be forced on Europe. http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/gallery/2002/05/09/verywellalone.jpg
I know there will be great difficulties in getting out of our entanglements with an autocratic US, but dare I say that it will also be a great relief to be free of that imperialist yoke.
I believe you are a tad hasty to dismiss the threat of Indonesia. I agree they are not a threat at present. But that does not mean they won’t be a threat in the mid or long term.
Seems to me that will Indonesia's fertility rate to fall below replacement by the end of tbe decade, they will have little need for more territory. I would point out that the net influx of Mexicans into the US ended when their fertility fell below 2.1, much of Latin American immigration now comes from Central America where fertility is still above 2.1 and from failed states like Venezuela.
While not disagreeing with you, its a little glib to suggest that the US not in NATO is as trivial as 100,000 less troops in Europe - especially given raw troop figures aren't the US military's strength. Its the asymmetric capabilities that matter - intelligence, special forces, long range strike - which just aren't as replaceable, even if Ukraine has 800,000 troops.
Long-range strike? Ukrainian drones - pilotless light aircraft - have hit targets in Tatarstan in the Urals, about 1400 km from Kyiv. American Tomahawk cruise missiles carry a much bigger payload, so the capabilities are not equal, but it's a quantitative not qualitative difference. Thee satellites may be irreplaceable by Ukraine alone, but Europe has earth observation satellites already, and Ariane launchers..
They aren't waiting for me to advise them. Canada is already looking to the EU and UK. Mercosur is an obvious fit for Mexico, and already has a trade agreement with the EU>
The Canada EU thing puzzles me, isn't the EU meant to be, well, Europe, as it says in the name? The place where Canada isn't? Or are all alliances now to be more cultural than geographic, as of course they often have been?
Fun fact, Canada shares a small land border with Europe, through Hans Island, which is part of Denmark.
More so, Canada's blend of social, political, and economic systems places it closer to Europe than the US in many respects, despite its geographical proximity to the United States. Consider Universal Healthcare, strong Social Safety Net, strong Labor Rights & Worker Protections, Gun Control, British Westminster system, Strong Regulation & Government Intervention, CETA, etc
Surely you mean New Caledonia, which is part of the French Republic. Where as Vanuatu is independent and a republic since 1980 while previously was part of the New Hebrides archipelago managed through an Anglo-French condominium.
With New Caledonia, Australian trade relations are shaped by European Union (EU) and French policies, as New Caledonia follows French trade regulations, tariffs, and economic policies.
France maintains control over New Caledonia’s defense, and Australian security cooperation often involves coordination with French military forces rather than New Caledonian authorities directly. France is a key partner in regional security initiatives such as the FRANZ Agreement (France, Australia, New Zealand cooperation in disaster response).
New Caledonia’s status as a French territory means that Australia’s engagement is shaped by France’s policies, EU trade regulations, and French defense arrangements. In contrast, Australia has more direct political, economic, and cultural ties with independent Pacific nations, reflecting its role as a regional leader.
The Canadian claim to the island arose from the 1880 purchase of Hudson's Bay Company land to Canadian Government territory. The Danish argument was that Hans Island was vital to their indigenous populations for fishing and custodial practices, creating an integral part of nearby Greenland.
Hans island was claimed by both Canada and Denmark until 14 June 2022, when both countries agreed to split the disputed island roughly in half. Hence the agreement ended a 51-year territorial dispute and established a land border between Canada and Denmark. In accordance with the Greenland home rule treaty, Denmark handles certain foreign affairs, such as border disputes, on behalf of the entire Danish Realm.
That assumes there are no costs to having nuclear weapons. The obvious one is the risk that an adversary (say China) will see the necessity of a first strike against those weapons, rather than t aking the sensible view that if we have anything they need, they can buy it
Europe without America
Trump at Davos on January 23: “I’m also going to ask all NATO nations to increase defense spending to 5 percent of GDP, which is what it should have been years ago..“ https://www.whitehouse.gov/remarks/2025/01/remarks-by-president-trump-at-the-world-economic-forum/
Since Trump, Vance and Hegseth have all made it clear that the USA is no longer bound by the NATO treaty, it’s not clear why the European members should pay attention to this unsolicited advice. They have in short order to rebuild their collective security minus the USA, and spend what they need to do it. There is no reason why they would need to spend anything like 5% of GDP for this.
The complete list of major military threats Europe needs to guard against is as follows:
1. Russian autocracy and imperialism.
There is no point 2. Jihadi terrorism, cyberwarfare and climate disruption are real securitty dangers, but cannot be dealt with by conventional armed forces. The USA may conceivably get itself into shooting wars with China over Taiwan or with Iran over Israel, but Europe has no reason to join in. Middle Eastern oil is fast becoming unimportant, in a buyers’ market of shrinking demand. There is no appetite for intervention in Africa’s civil wars, beyond the quixotic low-key French struggle for influence in the Sahel, in the poorest countries on Earth.
Russia, in case you hadn’t noticed, is tied up in a very costly war of its own choosing with Ukraine. It has lost a large part of the equipment it began with, and struggles unsuccessfully to replace, and an enormous number of soldiers. https://babel.ua/en/news/115436-general-staff-russia-lost-another-1-180-soldiers-and-11-tanks The threat it represents to other European countries such as Poland, Finland and is far *less* than in 2022. You could make a strong case that non-Ukraine defence spending could be cut, not raised. Why does the Royal Navy need aircraft carriers?
My suggestion is to forget about the total volume of defence spending and concentrate on the one real problem, arming Ukraine to defend itself. Initially, the urgent need is to replace lost US military aid. The 2024 US package was $61.3 bn, and Trump is obviously not going to renew it. BTW, MAGA suckers, most of this was spent in-country on US arms, creating manufacturing Real Jobs with Lockheed and General Dynamics. Europe will shift as much of this as possible to its own arms industry, to BAE, Thales, Nammo and Rheinmetall. American jobs will be lost.
What are the magnitudes here? US nominal GDP is about $27 trn, the EU’s $20 trn. Add the UK and Norway, solid allies of Ukraine, and you get $24 trn. $61.3 bn is 0.25% of $24 trn. Add non-military aid and an increase for luck, say $100 bn a year. This makes 0.42% of GDP. Non-Ukraine defence spending can be left flat. This all needs to be sharpened up, but at worst Europe is looking at an increase in defence spending of 0.5% of GDP.
OF course we can afford this. Tomorrow.
The venerable Michael Ignatieff was on radio the other day https://www.abc.net.au/listen/programs/global-roaming/global-roaming-canada-america-trump-michael-ignatieff/104855450. He concluded (I think) that the "world" was re-organising into three poles, headed by Russia, China & USA. Saying (I think, again) that China will be left to control East Asia, Russia to control Europe and USA it's immediate region. Timothy Snyder is on the EU's case, urging the European democracies to shape up to the imminent pressures.
Seems to me that Australia's importance is to the Anglophone collective as a critical piece of real estate for defending its values, and as resource of minerals. But on the matter of those rare earths & critical minerals, we've probably left the run too late. Either the leases are already in the hands of private enterprise, or the business of breaking new ground will be much more difficult due to pre-existing claims over ownership.
A spokesperson for a manufacturing union (??) was on ABC radio today pleading for more home-grown processing of iron & aluminium. I can hear the IPA & Murdoch's foot-soldiers screaming already. (More unionists! Heaven forbid!) I fear not even an Albanese-led ALP has the courage to stand up for trades unions as a central harmonising & civilising part of a liberal democracy. Jason Stanley in 'How Fascism Works' has a pretty good explanation of why labor unions are always in the sights of autocratic forces.
This greatly overestimates Russia, which is little more than a Chinese client now, incapable of defeating Ukraine, let alone the EU as a whole. Europe is the third pole and the only big representative of democracy left
As for the Anglosphere (including Deep State relics like the Five Eyes), Trump's threat to invade Canada will put paid to that idea fairly soon
I point to Branko Milanovic's https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/how-the-mainstream-has-abandoned where he signs off with "This is not a world of globalization, but of parceled regionalisms and even nationalism." How Australia shakes out in the longer term is less up to our "allies" (US, UK or 5Eyes) and much more on how we can re-fashion a national project.
Also to note that EU has a way to go in order to present a consolidated front to oppose Putin's take-over of Moldova. EU doesn't have a common language nor a centrally organised military.
I went to the library yesterday to catch up on Nick Bryant's latest in The Age. Reminded me how newspapers are a dead loss (for nit-picky consumers like me.) This one was packed with ads and lifestyle garbage. Outlets like Substack are helpful in providing "free" access to a wide diversity of written thought, but I can't fathom how serious writers can make a living. Thanks for the opportunity to sound off. 🫡
It was going to happen eventually. A soft landing was what I was hoping for.
It seems that all agreements are rock solid until they aren't, the reason for breach being for "self defence". Threats don't necessarily have to be in a military form; attacks on culture, morality or identity will suffice. Culture wars precede military conflict, they just won't give up will they?
So when considering the alternatives, we don't seem to have much to choose from.
I view AUKUS as extortion and that seems to be how it is, we have to buy our peace in instalments. My next car will be a Chinese EV.
I agree with John’s optimistic take on Ukraine. Admittedly I have been wrong before on short-term battlefield prospects. I underestimated the fatalistic resilience of Russian soldiers, and ability to keep going with inferior equipment and commanders. But the basic argument for Ukrainian victory is unchanged.
Putin’s Bonapartist system is far more fragile than Soviet Communism, let alone democracy. It relies on the acquiescence rather than the commitment of ordinary Russians, sustained by nonstop fantasy propaganda on TV and exemplary repression rather than blanket police-state microsurveillance. The system is vulnerable to shocks, as the Prigozhin drama showed. .Accordingly Putin has not felt able to put Russia on a true war footing, as Ukraine has done. In particular there is no full mobilisation and Russian men have to be enticed to volunteer by large signup bonuses. Nor has he felt able to confiscate their phones, so the Russian web is full of horrible videos showing the appalling conditions and continuous heavy losses of men and equipment at the front. Ukrainian control of the skies is so great that drones are sent out in swarms to hunt down defenceless single soldiers and kill them with small grenades. Brainwashed into fear of “Nazi” cruelty, few take the option of surrendering to a drone.
Access to social media has not yet enabled organised mutiny, but first-hand news filters back to families and makes new recruitment steadily more difficult and expensive. Russia makes small gains in territory, but at massive cost: typically well over 1,000 casualties a day, and a steady drain on air defence, armoured and soft-skinned vehicles, and artillery.
Most of the public in Ukraine’s allies get their news from mass media biased towards heart-rending images of regular senseless attacks on Ukrainian civilians – the power grid and rail system stay operational in spite of ineffective attacks. Ukraine’s manpower problems and draft evasion are well-aired. Only aficionados like me seek out information on successful Ukrainian defensive operations, and deep drone and missile strikes on oil refineries, tank farms, airfields, ammunition dumps, and command posts, which Russia is powerless to stop. One refinery set on fire was in Omsk, 2,000 km east of Moscow: this must have been sabotage rather than a drone. Ukraine can keep these up indefinitely, until the logistics at the front break down completely.
Hegseth said today that the USA was deprioritising Europe and opined that return to Ukraine’s 2014 borders was “unrealistic”. He and Trump can’t have it both ways. If the USA is walking away from NATO, it doesn’t have a veto on its European members. I’ve pointed out before, that the diplomatic rule of consensus is a lot weaker than it looks at first sight, since the (n-1) other countries can always reassemble in the next room and adopt the policy you are trying to veto. NATO would be more complicated than this to unwind, but the same principle holds. “Very well, together” may be forced on Europe. http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/gallery/2002/05/09/verywellalone.jpg
I know there will be great difficulties in getting out of our entanglements with an autocratic US, but dare I say that it will also be a great relief to be free of that imperialist yoke.
I'm also wondering how long Europe will last as a democracy, as it seems the far-right parties are emboldened by Trump's success in taking power.
The European right were emboldened by Brexit, too, until everyone saw what a mess it was.
Please don't comment here any more.
Excellent article, thanks.
I believe you are a tad hasty to dismiss the threat of Indonesia. I agree they are not a threat at present. But that does not mean they won’t be a threat in the mid or long term.
Seems to me that will Indonesia's fertility rate to fall below replacement by the end of tbe decade, they will have little need for more territory. I would point out that the net influx of Mexicans into the US ended when their fertility fell below 2.1, much of Latin American immigration now comes from Central America where fertility is still above 2.1 and from failed states like Venezuela.
https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/IDN/indonesia/fertility-rate
While not disagreeing with you, its a little glib to suggest that the US not in NATO is as trivial as 100,000 less troops in Europe - especially given raw troop figures aren't the US military's strength. Its the asymmetric capabilities that matter - intelligence, special forces, long range strike - which just aren't as replaceable, even if Ukraine has 800,000 troops.
Looking at US track record of military failure from Vietnam onwards*, I'm unconvinced they have a special sauce possessed by no-one else
* Arguably from the moment they reached the Yalu river in 1950.
Long-range strike? Ukrainian drones - pilotless light aircraft - have hit targets in Tatarstan in the Urals, about 1400 km from Kyiv. American Tomahawk cruise missiles carry a much bigger payload, so the capabilities are not equal, but it's a quantitative not qualitative difference. Thee satellites may be irreplaceable by Ukraine alone, but Europe has earth observation satellites already, and Ariane launchers..
That said, with the US now unilaterally applying blanket tarrifs, is it now time to disavow the cumbersome US-AU trade treaty?
Trump has already repudiated the treaty along with USMCA which he negotiated himself.
What advice would you have to Canada and Mexico? Join Mercosur? Join the EU?
They aren't waiting for me to advise them. Canada is already looking to the EU and UK. Mercosur is an obvious fit for Mexico, and already has a trade agreement with the EU>
The Canada EU thing puzzles me, isn't the EU meant to be, well, Europe, as it says in the name? The place where Canada isn't? Or are all alliances now to be more cultural than geographic, as of course they often have been?
Australia has been in Eurovision for years, and the UK just joined the TransPacific Partnership.
OTOH, current EU rules specifically limit membership to European countries, so for the moment it will just be a free trade agreement.
Fun fact, Canada shares a small land border with Europe, through Hans Island, which is part of Denmark.
More so, Canada's blend of social, political, and economic systems places it closer to Europe than the US in many respects, despite its geographical proximity to the United States. Consider Universal Healthcare, strong Social Safety Net, strong Labor Rights & Worker Protections, Gun Control, British Westminster system, Strong Regulation & Government Intervention, CETA, etc
Great point
Well if Vanuatu is part of France …
Surely you mean New Caledonia, which is part of the French Republic. Where as Vanuatu is independent and a republic since 1980 while previously was part of the New Hebrides archipelago managed through an Anglo-French condominium.
With New Caledonia, Australian trade relations are shaped by European Union (EU) and French policies, as New Caledonia follows French trade regulations, tariffs, and economic policies.
France maintains control over New Caledonia’s defense, and Australian security cooperation often involves coordination with French military forces rather than New Caledonian authorities directly. France is a key partner in regional security initiatives such as the FRANZ Agreement (France, Australia, New Zealand cooperation in disaster response).
New Caledonia’s status as a French territory means that Australia’s engagement is shaped by France’s policies, EU trade regulations, and French defense arrangements. In contrast, Australia has more direct political, economic, and cultural ties with independent Pacific nations, reflecting its role as a regional leader.
oops, yes, sorry, late night brain slippage.
Apparently Canada and Denmark take turns planting flags on Hans Island, so it’s politely contested, if that makes a difference
OK, that definitely makes Canada part of Europe, there is Europe's entire history as pantomime.
The Canadian claim to the island arose from the 1880 purchase of Hudson's Bay Company land to Canadian Government territory. The Danish argument was that Hans Island was vital to their indigenous populations for fishing and custodial practices, creating an integral part of nearby Greenland.
Hans island was claimed by both Canada and Denmark until 14 June 2022, when both countries agreed to split the disputed island roughly in half. Hence the agreement ended a 51-year territorial dispute and established a land border between Canada and Denmark. In accordance with the Greenland home rule treaty, Denmark handles certain foreign affairs, such as border disputes, on behalf of the entire Danish Realm.
https://arcticportal.org/ap-library/news/3585-the-whisky-war-a-tale-of-peaceful-resolution-over-hans-island
Thank you so much for the update. I do think we should qualify for membership in the EU
If anything this proves the opposite. Our jets are flying much closer to China than their ships are sailing close to Australia.
That assumes there are no costs to having nuclear weapons. The obvious one is the risk that an adversary (say China) will see the necessity of a first strike against those weapons, rather than t aking the sensible view that if we have anything they need, they can buy it