Czech nuclear deal shows CSIRO GenCost is too optimistic, and new nukes are hopelessly uneconomic
My first article for RenewEconomy
I’ve written another piece on the uneconomics of nuclear power in Australia
The big unanswered question about nuclear power in Australia is how much it would cost. The handful of plants completed recently in the US and Europe have run way over time and over budget, but perhaps such failures can be avoided. On the other hand, the relatively successful Barakah project in the United Arab Emirates was undertaken in conditions that aren’t comparable to a democratic high-wage country like Australia. Moreover, the cost of the project, wrapped up in a long-term contract for both construction and maintenance, remains opaque. Most other projects are being constructed by Chinese or Russian firms, not an option for Australia
In these circumstances, CSIRO’s Gencost project relied mainly on evidence from Korea, one of the few developed countries to maintain a nuclear construction program. Adjusting for the costs of starting from scratch, CSIRO has come up with an estimated construction cost for a 1000 MW nuclear plant of at least $A8.6 billion, leading to an estimated Levelised Cost of Energy (LCOE) of between $163/MWh-$264/MWh, for large-scale nuclear. But, given the limited evidence base, critics like Dick Smith have been able to argue that CSIRO has overestimated the capital costs.
Thanks to a recent announcement from Czechia, we now have the basis for a more informed estimate. Ever since the commissioning its last nuclear plan in 2003, Czech governments have sought commercial agreements for the construction of more nuclear power plants, with little success until recently.
Finally, after a process beginning in 2020, the Czech government sought tenders from three firms to build at least two, and possibly four 1000 MW reactors. After Westinghouse was excluded for unspecified failures to meet tender conditions, two contenders remained: EDF and KNHP. On 17 July it was announced that KNHP had submitted the winning bid, which, coincidentally, set the cost per GW at $8.6 billion.
Sadly for nuclear advocates, that figure is in $US. Converted to $A, it’s 12.8 billion, around 50 per cent more than the CSIRO Gencost estimate. At that price, the LCOE, even on the most favorable assumptions, will exceed $225/MWh.
And unlike the case in Australia, Czechia is offering a brownfield site, at no additional cost. The new plants will replace existing Soviet-era reactors at Dukovany. By contrast, in Australia under Dutton’s proposals, the costs of a nuclear plant would need to include the compulsory acquisition of existing sites, from mostly unwilling vendors.
The bad news doesn’t stop there. The (inevitably optimistic) target date for electricity generation is 2038, about the time Australia’s last coal plants will be closing. But the Czechs have at least a five year head start on Australia, even assuming that a Dutton government could begin a tender process soon after taking office. In reality, it would be necessary to establish and staff both a publicly owned nuclear generation enterprise and a nuclear regulatory agency with an appropriate legislative framework.
And there’s one more wrinkle. Westinghouse, excluded from the Czech bid is engaged on long-running litigation with KNHP, claiming a breach of intellectual property. It’s been unsuccessful so far, but a final ruling is not expected until 2025. If Westinghouse succeeds, the Czech project will almost certainly be delayed.
Summing up, taking the Czech announcement as a baseline, building two to four 1000 MW nuclear plants in Australia would probably cost $50-$100 billion, and not be complete until well into the 2040s.
If nuclear power is so costly, why have the Czechs chosen to pursue this technology. The explanation is partly historical. The former Czechoslovakia was an early adopter of nuclear power and, despite the usual delays and cost overruns, enthusiasm for the technology seems to have persisted.
More significant, however, is the influence of one man, Vaclav Klaus, a dominant figure in Czech politics from the dissolution of the Soviet bloc to the 2010s. Apart from sharing the same first name, Klaus has little in common with the architect of Czech freedom, Vaclav Havel. Klaus was, and remains an extreme climate science denialist, whose views are reflected by the rightwing party he founded, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS). Although Klaus himself left office under a cloud in 2013, ODS remained a dominant force.
The current Czech Prime Minister, Petr Fiala (also ODS) has followed the same evolution as other ‘sceptics’, shifting from outright denial to what Chris Bowen has described as “all-too-hard-ism”. And with high carbon prices in Europe, persisting with coal is even less tenable than in Australia. In political terms, nuclear power is the ideal solution to the problem of replacing coal without embracing renewables. It’s just a pity about the economics.
With luck, Australia can learn from the Czech lesson. Even under the favorable conditions of a brownfield site and an established nuclear industry, new nuclear power is hopelessly uneconomic.
Read my newsletter
Meanwhile, back on the solar farm, Chinese pv module prices fell 42% in 2023. Reuters: “At the end of 2023, China's annual production capacity for finished solar modules was 861 gigawatts (GW) equivalent [...], more than double global module installations of 390 GW. […] Production capacity is expected to increase by a further 500 or 600 GW this year.”
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/china-solar-industry-faces-shakeout-rock-bottom-prices-persist-2024-04-03/
At a generous 4:1 ratio to account for the different capacity factors, Chinese pv production capacity equates to 215 1-GW nuclear reactors per year at end 2023, 340 reactors per year this December. The pampered and shrinking nuclear industry is a mere pimple on the backside of the solar giant. The Australian government could go to Longi or Jinko today and buy 16 GW of panels, enough to balance Dutton’s four reactors by God knows when, for delivery in 12 months, and they would get a quotation by return of post.
Ah, intone the nuclear fans, “the sun doesn’t always shine”, as if grid managers had not thought of the fact. You do need to firm solar with storage, as you indeed have to do with nuclear reactors that shut down regularly for maintenance. If you were trying to match the output curve of a reactor with solar, you would need 1:1 daily backup, very expensive. But the flat output curve of a must-run reactor is itself is a problem for grid managers. Their ideal generator is both reliable and flexible: a shopping list met today only by gas, geothermal, hydro and batteries. Gas pollutes, geothermal is scarce (hydrothermal) or jam tomorrow (hot rocks), so hydro and batteries it is.
The curve they need to match is sine-wave daily load, not nuclear’s flat output. For solar you need eight hours’ or so of backup, not 24. This turns out to be doable and affordable. Adding cheap wind energy, typically with variation inversely correlated to solar on a cycle of weeks not hours, complicates the picture without changing the conclusion. Adding hydrogen generation is a strange Rube Goldberg scheme that complicates the picture without offering lower costs or greater reliability. WWS has solved the problem, people. Get on with it.
A personal footnote. I recently added to my rooftop solar, and looked for the first time at the five-minute daily output. It was still 170 watts – 4% of peak output – just before sunrise and after sunset, from light backscattered by the whole sky. In a way, the sun doesn’t actually need to shine for pv to keep working.
But we can build nuclear, apparently, merely through Peter Dutton's willpower. Oh and a huge government (ie. taxpayer) subsidy.